WHEN ISLANDS DROWN: THE PLIGHT OF “CLIMATE
CHANGE REFUGEES” AND RECOURSE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
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1. INTRODUCTION
The age-old fantasy of escaping to a tropical island may be
coming to an end: with global warming and climate change
threatening to raise the oceans, literally, many islands do not stand
a chance. For Tuvalu (formerly known as the Ellice Islands), a
small island nation in the Southern Pacific, the dangers of the
future are already looming, with threats of displacement, fear, and
loss. In fifty years, “Tuvalu[ans] will likely face a tragic ending to
their pictorial way of life.”1 Some scientists predict that Tuvalu
may become the first populated island to be swallowed by the
ocean.2 If and when that happens, the island’s more than 11,000
inhabitants will need more than just a dry place to go; they will
need a new land on which to re-create their nation and their lives.
In response to their seemingly impending doom, Tuvalu has
taken some drastic and necessary international measures. Fighting
back against the injustice of literally losing their home out from
under their feet, the islanders contemplated litigation against those
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A.
International Development Studies with Italian Minor, 2006, University of
California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Professors Fernando Chang-Muy,
Harry Reicher, Howard Chang, and Cary Coglianese for their comments and
discussions on this topic, as well as Penn Law Reference Librarian William Draper
for his research insights and continuous motivation. Most of all, my biggest
thanks to my family and friends—especially my mom, sister Vickie, Jasper A.
Cacananta, and Kristel Siongco. Their unending support of my sometimesidealistic dreams of saving rainforests and stopping climate change encourages
me to continue trying to pursue them.
1 Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs, Comment, Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law
Issues in Tuvalu’s Threat to Sue The United States in the International Court of Justice,
14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 103, 103 (2005).
2 See id. at 103–04 (“Some scientists predict that the island . . . will sink into
the ocean by the year 2054 due to the adverse effects of global warming.”).
Several unpopulated islands have been engulfed already by the Pacific Ocean. Id.
at 104.
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countries that they feel are shirking responsibility for their
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions by not signing onto the Kyoto
Protocol.3 Additionally, a former Prime Minister of Tuvalu made
numerous international pleas, asking nearby Australia and New
Zealand to grant refugee status to the island’s thousands of
inhabitants.4 These short-term actions and “solutions” have been
rather ineffective, and Tuvalu is still sinking into the Pacific.
This comment explores the use of the existing refugee regime
to accommodate Tuvaluans and similarly placed “climate change
refugees” and then suggests international human rights law as an
effective catalyst to urge expansion of the refugee regime. Section
2 examines the basics of climate change as a scientific phenomenon
and explains why Tuvalu finds itself in its current plight. Section 3
surveys the current international refugee regime, with the curious
and potentially harmful distinction between a “refugee,” as
internationally defined, and a “climate change refugee,” as the
people of Tuvalu have been described. Section 4 argues for the use
of human rights law as a more effective vehicle than refugee law to
offer the island nation redress. It begins with an enumeration of
some of the universal human rights that Tuvaluans should enjoy
and which are being infringed by climate change. Section 5
advocates for expansion of the legal definition of a refugee based
on human rights claims to include climate change victims. Finally,
Section 6 concludes with a demand for future regime changes. The
human rights arena creates obligations that mandate international
actions to save Tuvaluans and future “climate change refugees.”
2. CLIMATE CHANGE
By 2007, even corporate media giant Rupert Murdoch
recognized that “[c]limate change poses clear, catastrophic threats”
3 See id. at 104–05 (describing the Tuvaluan Prime Minister’s announcement
that the nation would bring suit in the International Court of Justice against
nations refusing to enter into the Pact). In the end, Tuvalu did not sue the United
States or Australia as threatened because the jurisdictional and standing concerns
proved to be too high. See Timo Koivurova, International Legal Avenues to Address
the Plight of Victims of Climate Change: Problems and Prospects, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
267, 279 (2007) (“The central reason for this standstill is jurisdictional.”).
4 See Jacobs, supra note 1, at 107 n.30 and accompanying text (describing the
Tuvaluan Prime Minister’s request for environmental refugee status for his
citizens); All Things Considered: Tuvalu (National Public Radio broadcast Nov. 15,
2001), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1133294 (last
visited Apr. 9, 2010) [hereinafter NPR] (reporting that New Zealand has agreed to
accept 60 Tuvaluans per year as environmental refugees).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss4/6

2010]

CLIMATE CHANGE “REFUGEES”

1241

and further stated, “[w]e may not agree on the extent, but we
certainly can’t afford the risk of inaction.”5
Nevertheless,
governments continue to question the source and extent of
damages that climate change will produce in the following
decades. And while the Western world debates the causes,
liabilities, and effects of climate change, the developing world has
already begun to experience the devastations of such
environmental phenomena: floods, typhoons, and droughts of
catastrophic proportions impact millions around the globe
annually. In fact, the conclusions of many scientists show that
climate change has already had a significant impact on humans
and the environment.6 One hundred fifty thousand have lost their
lives,7 many more have lost their homes,8 and over five million
people—most of whom live in the poorest nations—have become
sick with serious illnesses (such as malaria) that spread more
quickly due to global warming.9
Climate change will invariably affect all countries to some
degree, but its impacts are predicted to fall largely and
disproportionately on the developing world. Smaller island
nations will likely be the hardest hit, as they will literally shrink in
size until they are engulfed completely by the oceans that surround
them. Current national and international “inactions”—whether in
waiting to establish legal causation, abstaining from global treaties
to curtail GHG emissions, or refusing to acknowledge contribution,
and thus liability for emissions—stagnate international
momentum, which, in turn, will likely contribute to widespread
destruction and loss on Tuvalu and other small island nations.

5 Rupert Murdoch, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, News Corp.,
Address to his Employees (May 9, 2007), available at http://www.wbcsd.org
/plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?type=DocDet&ObjectId=MjQ2MTg.
6 Derald J. Hay, Post-Kyoto Stress Disorder: How the United States Can Influence
International Climate Change Policy, 15 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 493, 493 (2008).
7 See id. (describing the effects of climate change thus far).
8 See Michael G. Faure & Andre Nollkaemper, International Liability as an
Instrument to Prevent and Compensate for Climate Change, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 123, 124
(2007) (discussing the plight of the island nation of Tuvalu); Jacobs, supra note 1,
at 103–04 (parsing through Tuvalu’s potential legal claims for climate change
liability against the United States).
9 Hay, supra note 6, at 493.
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2.1. The Science Behind the Global Meltdown
Global warming is an environmental phenomenon that will
affect global ecosystems in countless and unknown ways. A major
effect presently discussed is the rise of sea levels due to melting
glaciers and ice caps.10 Until roughly twenty to twenty-five years
ago, it was thought that major ice sheets were relatively stable,
melting predictably and slowly over centuries at the very least.11
However, with accelerated melting and complete disintegration of
once-stable ice shelves, it has become clear that the changes in the
atmosphere and global temperatures threaten the entire Antarctic
ice shelf.12 Antarctica and Greenland hold ninety-eight to ninetynine percent of the world’s freshwater ice, and both show signs of
severe melting at an alarming pace.13 In fact, the United Nations
Environment Programme estimated that a total meltdown of the
Greenland ice sheet would trigger an estimated seven-meter rise in
sea levels.14 Even a twenty percent melting in Greenland and five
percent melting of the Antarctic ice sheet would result in a four or
five meter sea level rise.15 Once this happens, small islands will
disappear, landmasses will shrink, and oceans will grow. Sir
David King, Science Advisor for the British Government,
commented that when this occurs, “[t]he Maps of the world will
have to be redrawn.”16 This ominous message does not bode well
for Tuvalu, an island whose highest point is only five meters above

10 See WORLD VISION, PLANET PREPARE: PREPARING COASTAL COMMUNITIES IN
ASIA FOR FUTURE CATASTROPHES: ASIA PACIFIC DISASTER REPORT 14 (2008), available
at
http://www.wvasiapacific.org/downloads/PlanetPrepare_LowRes.pdf
(describing the affects of melting ice caps); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (“IPCC”), CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 30–54 (2007),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf
[hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT] (examining observed changes in the global climate,
the causes of these observed changes, and the possible future impact of these
changes).
11 WORLD VISION, supra note 10, at 15.
12 See id. (describing how quickly the ice shelves are disintegrating).
13 Id. at 14. See SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 45 (projecting increased ice
flow from Greenland and Antarctica at the rates observed for 1993–2003).
14 WORLD VISION, supra note 10, at 14. Accord SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 10,
at 47 (discussing how projected ice sheet contraction will “continue to contribute
to sea level rise”). For an extensive list of projected rises in sea level and surface
temperatures, see id. at 45 tbl.3.1.
15 WORLD VISION, supra note 10, at 14.
16 Id.
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sea level.17 In fact, most of the twenty-six square kilometer island
nation is less than a meter above sea level.18 Moreover, since
scientists have predicted a one-meter sea level rise, it is clear why
Tuvaluans are justifiably worried—the ocean is drowning their
home.
2.2. Climate Change is Specialized Legal Risk
As nations point fingers and blame each other, nothing is being
done to help victims mitigate or adapt to the effects of climate
change. The islanders have not been successful in securing any
form of relief or rescue, whether preventative or humanitarian.
Three characteristics of climate change, which make it unlike any
other type of environmental disaster that the world has faced to
date, may explain why this is.
First, as it is a prospective disaster, present day preparations
and remedies may appear excessive or unnecessary. The lack of
consensus regarding the mere existence and scientific causes of
climate change often supports denials of help to climate change
victims.
Secondly, since climate change entails transboundary pollution,
the global nature of the cause means that prevention cannot be
effective if undertaken by isolated parties or nations. Any serious
efforts to curtail emissions or to change behaviors cannot be truly
successful without implicating the entire world.
Finally, climate change has a built-in disparate impact: those
countries producing the most harmful GHGs are usually the least
affected by climate change disasters, while those producing the
least seem to bear the greater brunt of global warming harms.
Moreover, the victims of climate change, often small islands or
poor nations, are frequently in the worst position to adapt and
mitigate the damages.
2.2.1.

Future-Based/Scientific Uncertainty

Unlike most other environmental harms, climate change
liability is almost entirely future-based. Tuvalu will have to
17 See Jacobs, supra note 1, at 107 (describing the island’s topography); Jason
D. Söderblom, Climate Change: National & Regional Security Threat Multiplier for
Australia, SECURITY SOLUTIONS Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 60, available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1101961 (examining some of the dangers which Tuvalu faces due to
climate change).
18 Söderblom, supra note 17, at 60.
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prepare for a future harm caused by past, current, and future
emissions around the globe. The fact that the harm has not yet
happened means that victim-states will have to prove not only
causation, but some degree of certainty about exactly how much
land will be flooded, how severe a tropical storm will be, or how
many people might die. This unrealistic necessity will make
pinning responsibility on other nations difficult.
Moreover, the lack of international consensus on the causes
and effects of climate change is exploited by countries hoping to
avoid liability. The United States, for instance, has cited “scientific
uncertainty” as a rationale for non-participation in the Kyoto
Protocol19 and for not committing financial resources to fight
global warming.20 States and companies, mostly Western, use this
uncertainty surrounding the exact causes and effects of climate
change to cloud the issue and to avoid responsibility for their
contributions. However, the balance of science shows that it is
indeed anthropogenic emissions that are responsible for the
exacerbated effects of climate change.21
2.2.2.

Joint Liability: The “Global” Excuse

The global nature of climate change is often manipulated to
skirt liability.22 A key tenet of environmental regulation is that
those responsible for harming the environment should bear the
cost of protecting it.23 This “polluter pays” principle is challenged

19 See, e.g., Hay, supra note 6, at 504 (describing how President Bush cited
three reasons for the administration’s view that Kyoto was a failure, including
“scientific uncertainty regarding the threat of climate change.”).
20 See, e.g., Laurie Goering, Global Warming Can Be Reduced, But at What Cost?,
SEATTLE TIMES, May 21, 2007, at A1 (“Bush administration officials argued that the
same aggressive effort [the U.N. advocated to hold GHG emissions in check]
would throw the world’s economy into recession.”).
21 See SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 39 (“Most of the observed increase
in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the
observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations.”); see also Jacobs, supra
note 1, at 110 (“The [IPCC’s] Third Report also concluded that ‘most of [the]
observed warming over [the] last fifty years [was] likely due to increases in
[GHG] concentrations due to human activities.’”).
22 See Faure & Nollkaemper, supra note 8, at 133–34 (examining how a victim
may, in some circumstances, determine venue in climate change cases).
23 This principle was recognized internationally in the 1992 Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development. J. Martin Wagner, International Investment,
Expropriation and Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 470
(1999) (citing Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Rio
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in the arena of climate change liability by the fact that each and
every country, including “climate victims” like Tuvalu, is guilty to
some degree of contributing to GHG emissions. Should they all
pay? If not, should any? Because climate change is not an isolated,
past action perpetrated by a discrete set of individuals but rather a
set of probable harms and damages having effect hundreds if not
thousands of miles from the locations of emissions, victims of the
natural disasters related to climate change have a hard time
placing fault on any guilty parties. After all, we are all “guilty.”
Additionally, since it is the aggregate of GHGs in the
atmosphere causing polar ice caps and glaciers to melt, which in
turn causes the ocean levels to rise all around the world, it is
impossible to say how much pollution from any one entity caused
the specific harm suffered thousands of miles away.
The argument, from the perspective of the developed nations,
is that they cannot be held completely responsible for causing
climate change since even the smallest island nations put some
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Thus, since everyone shares
this “joint liability” for the damages of global warming and since
everyone will feel some effects due to climate change, it is unfair for
the developing nations to demand that only the developed nations
cease emitting.24
2.2.3.

Disparate Impacts Harm the Developing World

Finally, the disparate impact of climate change combined with
high adaptation costs perhaps best explains why the industrialized
world seems to be dragging its feet.25 The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change26 has detailed that climate change will have
different impacts on various regions. These impacts mean that:
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1
(June 13, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876).
24 This rationale was a crucial part of why the United States refused to sign
the Kyoto Protocol, which set binding emissions reduction targets for Annex B
countries (mostly the developed world) while leaving the emissions of the
developing world (i.e. China and India, whose combined emissions rival those of
developed nations) largely unregulated.
25 See Hay, supra note 6, at 506 (“[C]limate change will have a differentiated
impact on various regions.”).
26 The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is an
intergovernmental scientific body comprised of governments, scientists, and the
people, as represented by the United Nations Body; thus, the IPCC report
detailing climate change’s predicted disparate impact can be considered
authoritative and scientifically based. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
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“Many of those who will be most harmed by climate
change have contributed little to causing the problem.”
Furthermore, “those that are most vulnerable to climate
change are often least able to pay for adaptation measures
needed to protect them from climate change impacts.”
Therefore [lesser developed countries] will be unable to
implement programs for irrigation in the case of drought,
dikes in the event of flooding, or HVAC systems to prevent
heat stroke.27
Contrast this state of affairs with that of the United States or
another developed nation continuing to burn fossil fuels at an
alarming rate with no signs of slowing down, and it becomes clear
just how disparate climate change effects can be. The primary
contributors tend to be the least affected.28 Not coincidentally, they
are also best able to respond financially to climate-related crises.29
The fact that these nations feel far fewer disastrous effects from
climate change, coupled with their superior ability to adapt to any
changes felt, creates their false belief that climate change will not
happen anytime soon, that it is a vague and uncertain issue for the
future, and that it is not serious. Their distance from the disasters
that are already occurring in Tuvalu and other danger zones allows
an intellectual and moral distancing from responsibility and any
sense of urgency. The damage to nations like Tuvalu remains a
negative externality that no one can or is willing to pay for. These
disparate impacts, coupled with the justifications of scientific
uncertainty and joint liability, bolster international inertia.

Change, Organization, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm (last
visited Apr. 10, 2010) (describing the IPCC’s function).
27 Hay, supra note 6, at 506 (internal citations omitted).
28 The top ten GHG-emitting countries, in order, are: the United States,
China, the EU-25, Russia, India, Japan, Germany, Brazil, Canada, and the U.K. See
DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 663 (3d ed.
2007) (listing the top GHG emitting countries’ carbon equivalent emissions for six
GHGs); accord Hay, supra note 6, at 506–07 (arguing that the United States and
other developed nations are the least threatened by adverse climate change
impacts).
29 See id. at 506–07 (describing the United States’ superior position to mitigate
and adapt to climate change).
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2.3. The Climate Forecast for Tuvalu
Faced with economic justifications and international inertia,
Tuvalu continues to feel the ever-increasing effects of climate
change. For centuries, the islanders adapted to scarce resources
and fierce tropical storms that struck the island once or twice per
decade.30 However, the change in climate and atmosphere caused
these same devastating storms to strike seven times in the 1990s.31
Additionally, high tides and floods that traditionally occurred once
per year now frequently batter the island from November through
March, leaving Tuvaluans worried what the future holds for them.
As the island nation struggles to survive the physical rise of water
and the damage of storms, rising floodwaters have increased the
salt water table,32 exacerbating the already difficult agricultural
situation on the island.33 These floodwaters, or “king tides,” wash
over the island’s main roads and croplands, compounding the food
and freshwater scarcities.34 As food becomes scarce, health
problems such as diabetes and hunger will increase.35 Stagnating
30 See HOLLEY RALSTON ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGES TUVALU 7
(Germanwatch Climate Responsibility Campaign ed., 2004), available at
http://www.germanwatch.org/download/klak/fb-tuv-e.pdf
(“Tuvalu
has
always had to fight with extreme weather events like storm surges and floods.”);
Jacobs, supra note 1, at 105–06 (describing the history of Tuvalu’s inhabitants and
how they have dealt with extreme weather). “During the fiercest of these storms,
the inhabitants would protect themselves from being blown into the Pacific by
tying themselves to coconut palms, hoping the wind was not forceful enough to
take the rooted trees as well.” Id. at 106.
31 See Jacobs, supra note 1, at 106 (describing the multiplication in intensity
and number of natural disasters befalling Tuvalu because of global warming).
32 See id. (discussing the negative impact that rising water has had on island
agriculture).
33 See id. at 106–07 (explaining how sandy soil makes island agriculture
difficult and how global warming effects amplify this difficulty).
34 See Söderblom, supra note 17, at 60 (describing the damage “king tides”
have caused in Tuvalu); SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 49 (discussing the
exacerbating effects of climate change on freshwater availability); RALSTON ET AL.,
supra note 30, at 10 (“A great threat to food security is the rising sea level, which
leads to salinization of the soil and ground water.”); FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, A
CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO CLIMATE REFUGEES sec. 2 (2007), available at
http://www.foe.org.au/resources/publications/climate-justice/CitizensGuide
.pdf (“Saltwater intrusion reduces the land’s productive capabilities. It has
already affected communal crop gardens on six of Tuvalu’s eight islands.”).
35 See Söderblom, supra note 17, at 62 (describing the increases in disease that
accompany global warming); SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 48, 51, 53
(predicting health problems that global climate change may cause); FRIENDS OF THE
EARTH, supra note 34, sec. 2 (describing the increase in vector and waterborne
diseases accompanying warmer temperatures).
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water, variability in temperature, moisture, and solar radiation will
increase the frequency and seriousness of epidemics of serious
diseases such as malaria and dengue.36 Thus, the Tuvaluans are
faced with the harsh reality that “the future of [their] island above
water is rather grim.”37 In addition, even if they were somehow
able to stop the ocean from rising and engulfing their nation, they
would still face impossible challenges to their way of life.
Faced with an international stalemate of preventative inaction,
the Tuvaluans recognizes how few options remain for them as a
people. They “have conceded defeat in their battle with the rising
sea. They will abandon their homeland.”38 The only problem for
these so-called “climate change refugees” is finding a new land to
call home.
3.

“CLIMATE CHANGE REFUGEES”: A CONCEPT IN THE MAKING

Tuvalu’s chosen plan of action, international migration of the
entire nation, depends largely on their receiving refuge elsewhere.
While, as mentioned above,39 they have requested environmental
refugee status from New Zealand and Australia, they have not
found a satisfactory or sufficient solution.40 This is mainly because,
while they are popularly coined “environmental refugees” and
“climate change refugees” because they flee from very terrible
events that threaten their human rights and lives, they do not
qualify under the traditional legal definition of a “refugee.” Thus,
“climate change refugee” is actually an international misnomer,
with potentially dire consequences for Tuvalu.

36 See Söderblom, supra note 17, at 62 (discussing how climate change will
affect food production and cause associated health problems); RALSTON ET AL.,
supra note 30, at 13 (linking the warming climate to increasing prevalence of
insect-borne and water-borne diseases on numerous tropical islands).
37 Jacobs, supra note 1, at 106.
38 NPR, supra note 4; see id. (“The Pacific island nation of Tuvalu is slowly
sinking beneath the sea, the Prime Minister is worried, and the citizens have a
choice to make: they can watch as the beaches disappear or they can leave.”).
39 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
40 Under the Pacific Access Category immigration program, New Zealand
has agreed to accept seventy-five Tuvaluans a year who meet specific immigration
categories. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, supra note 34, at 6. Australia, on the other
hand, has refused to accept any environmental refugees from Tuvalu. Id.
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3.1. The Traditional Refugee Definition Does Not Include
Environmental Displacement
The definition of a refugee was set out in the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee
Convention” or “Convention”).41 Over fifty years later, this
definition has been adopted, often verbatim, by most countries
implementing their refugee statutes.42 The definition requires (i) a
fear, (ii) that is well-founded, (iii) of persecution (iv) based on
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.43
Only if those strict requirements set forth in the definition are
met, especially regarding persecution based on one of the five
allowable grounds, will those fleeing be afforded refuge in a host
country. However, for those who meet the definition laid out in
the Refugee Convention, the specific and legal protections are
extensive. Those who can meet the standards of being a refugee
under the Convention’s definition are first protected from being
forced to return to homelands from which they flee, and, more
importantly, allowed to resettle and establish new lives in host
countries.44 While this may seem potentially fruitful for Tuvalu,
they do not meet the definition. “Environment” and “climate
change” are not one of the five accepted grounds, and Tuvaluans
do not count as “refugees” under the Convention definition.45

41 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention] (entered into force Apr.
22, 1954), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/refugees.htm.
42 See Jessica B. Cooper, Student Article, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the
Requirements of the Refugee Definition, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 480, 480 (1998)
[hereinafter Cooper] (describing how the U.N. definition of a “refugee” remains
the “functional core of international refugee jurisprudence”).
43 Refugee Convention, supra note 41, art. 1.
44 Cooper, supra note 42, at 481.
45
For a discussion on why environmentally displaced persons should not
count under the traditional refugee definition and laws as they stand see Kara K.
Moberg, Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons
Displaces Necessary Protection, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1107, 1113 (2009). “[E]nvironmental
migrants are unlikely to benefit from the definition of refugee and [there are]
dangers in construing the law to allow [them] to fall under the pre-existing
refugee definition.” Id.
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Scholars who comment on this disconnect explain,
“[u]nfortunately, the refugee definition is a product of its time.”46
Negotiated and adopted in the tragic aftermath of WWII, the
Refugee Convention seemed to limit itself to those events that had
just happened: it reflected Western notions of rights and needs as
seen from a Western perspective after World War II.47 Moreover,
this limited scope48 “was intended to distribute the European
refugee burden without any binding obligation to reciprocate by
way of the establishment of rights for, or the provision of
assistance to, non-European refugees.”49 And while temporal and
geographic limitations were eliminated fifteen years later in the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,50 the implications of the
initial Eurocentric definition of refugee still has lasting
consequences for the modern so-called “climate change refugee.”
Because the 1967 Protocol included no review of the
substantive content of the definition,51 the narrowness of the five
enumerated categories was not and has not since been reviewed.
As Musalo et al. conclude: “This means that most Third World
refugees remain de facto excluded, as their flight is more often
prompted by natural disaster, war, or broadly based political and
economic turmoil than by ‘persecution,’ at least as that term is
understood in the Western context.”52 Also excluded from the list
of permissible reasons for fleeing are environmental concerns,
including climate change. For Tuvaluans and many other modern
day “refugees,” the Refugee Convention, as it currently stands,
provides no protection or hope for remedy. Climate change
refugees simply are not “refugees” in the legal sense.

46 Cooper, supra note 42, at 482; see also Moberg, supra note 45, at 1128
(describing the refugee definition as unchanged since its promulgation in 1951).
47 Cooper, supra note 42, at 482.
48 See KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 36 (3d ed. 2007) (describing the limits on the refugee
definition).
49 Id.
50 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
(1967) (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967), available at http://www2.ohchr.org
/english/law/protocolrefugees.htm.
51 See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 48, at 36 (discussing the elimination of the
restrictive requirement that a refugee’s claim relate to an event in pre-1951
Europe; extending protection to refugees from other parts of the world).
52 Id.
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3.2. What is a “Climate Change Refugee”?
Regardless of whether they fit the legal definition of a
Convention Refugee, Tuvaluans and other similarly displaced
persons have been forced to move from their homes and traditional
ways of life due wholly or in part to environmental reasons. The
environmental events prompting these displacements range from
flood to famine, industrial disasters to deforestation. Often, the
causes are interlinked and multi-faceted, making it even harder for
the environmental refugees to pinpoint the exact causes forcing
them to flee to safer areas.
The number of environmentally displaced persons worldwide
has been estimated to be 25 million.53 This number has been
further projected to rise to 150 million by the year 2050.54 The
sheer number of persons who fall into this misnomer refugee
category prompts a reevaluation of what international legal
avenues are available to someone society has deemed a climate
change refugee but to whom the law refuses to grant the
protections of being a Convention refugee.
3.3. Putting Aside the “Refugee” Misnomer
The exclusion from the protections and securities afforded
under the Refugee Convention means that even though Tuvaluans
have compelling reasons for leaving for new lands to reestablish
their nation and their home, they do not have the right to do so.
Tuvaluans are searching for permission to relocate their entire
nation piece-mail to different countries, sacrificing their human
rights to life, health, food and water, culture, self-determination,
and property. Notwithstanding the fact that these rights are all
protected through international human rights laws, they will be
infringed upon once the waters close in over Tuvalu.
States like Tuvalu—threatened with the death of their nation at
the hands of climate change—are left with this list of human rights
that will be violated once they lose their land, but no recourse or
redress under international refugee law. So what can other states
in similar positions do, aside from beg for environmental asylum
and divide their nation? Recourse to international human rights
53 Dana Zartner Falstrom, Perspective: Stemming the Flow of Environmental
Displacement: Creating a Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment,
13 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y Y.B. 1, 4 (2002).
54 Id.
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law indicates potentially positive results for future Tuvalus.
Climate-change-related human rights abuses cannot and should
not be overlooked simply because the persecutor is “natural” or
because environment is not explicitly one of the five enumerated
categories granted protection under the Refugee Convention.
Since the passing of the Convention—at a time when global
warming sounded more pleasant than threatening and when
islanders on Tuvalu never could imagine losing their entire
existence—the number of environmentally displaced persons has
spiked. The modern-day phenomenon of drowning islands and
flooded nations requires a reassertion of the basic human rights
that all peoples share and the taking of accountability for the
infringement of those rights by emitting nations.
Rather than continuing to call Tuvaluans “climate change
refugees”, and thereby cementing them into a legal regime that
presently does not provide them with an appropriate or adequate
remedy for their situation, we should put aside the misnomer for
now and focus instead on arguing something more legally
enforceable: the infringement of the universal and basic human
rights of Tuvaluans as environmentally displaced persons
(“EDP”).55
4.

A LEGAL LIFESAVER: THE HUMAN RIGHTS LENS

As Tuvalu’s pleas for relocation and attempts at litigation have
fallen short of a workable solution for a drowning nation, the
island should focus on human rights as a potential next step.
4.1. Why the Human Rights Approach is Necessary
The European governments adopted “a refugee definition
which reflected their political objectives and values, and focused
more on the protection of civil and political rights, than economic,
cultural or social rights.”56 However, their success does not reflect
a universal consensus that those latter rights do not merit
55 The use of the term “environmentally displaced person” rather than
“climate change refugee” removes the problematic issue of dependence upon
narrowly interpreted international refugee law for recourse. Rather than waste
time arguing a tentative position under the Refugee Convention, Tuvalu and
other states can then focus on their infringed human rights and the obligations
created from those rights in order to find liability for climate change and its
environmental effects.
56 MUSALO ET AL., supra note 48, at 367.
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protection for refugee populations; rather, it merely demonstrates
how the current definition is insufficient to cover the broad range
of human experiences and fears of persecution. The rights that
were largely ignored in the original definition are universally
protected. These include, inter alia, the rights to life, health,
food/water, livelihood, culture, privacy and home life, and
property.
Human rights and the environment are intertwined, as both
mutually rely on each other: Many of the aforementioned rights
are extremely sensitive to environmental degradation,57 and
environmental protection is beginning to depend upon the
protection of human rights law. In Tuvalu’s case in particular, the
U.N. Human Rights Committee has stated:
Tuvalu on its own is incapable of fully protecting the wide
range of rights and freedoms directly implicated by climate
change; even though those rights are guaranteed under
national and international law. This is because the ultimate
cause of climate change originates far beyond the borders
of the country and far beyond its effective control. Thus,
the international community, in particular the major
emitting countries of the developed world, must
themselves also take responsibility for promoting and
protecting the human rights of Tuvaluans by arresting their
dangerous interference with the global climate system.58
Because Tuvalu cannot protect the human rights of its citizens
from being violated by global warming, the major emitters of
GHGs are required, under the human rights framework, to
proactively protect these rights by curtailing their own emissions
and warming-inducing activities.
4.2. Why the Human Rights Approach is Appropriate
Human rights are inextricably linked with climate change
issues precisely because climate change is a human problem with

57 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 1366 (explaining the interplay between
human rights and the environment).
58 Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for
Political Action, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 465 (2009) (quoting the Human Rights
Committee).
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human consequences and dilemmas.59 Furthermore, any strategy
“’to deal with climate change, whether in terms of adaptation or
mitigation, must incorporate the consequences for humans, as
individuals and communities, and the human rights framework is
the most effective way to do so.’”60
4.3. Why the Human Rights Approach Works
The human rights approach to climate change works because it
emphasizes the legal rights guaranteed by international human
rights documents universally ratified and enforceable against
emitting states.
Indeed, human rights treaty bodies can
progressively issue rights in the face of climate change or on the
obligations of states charged with responsibility to uphold the
rights of others. 61 Where global warming seems like a purely
scientific problem, international human rights law imposes
obligations on emitting States to address human vulnerabilities to
climate change. 62 This human rights perspective shifts the focus of
the legal enforcement mechanisms more directly onto the
individuals affected by climate change. Furthermore, “human
rights also introduce an accountability framework that is an
essential element of the promotion and protection of human rights

59 See Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT ix (Anne
F. Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick eds., 2000).

Human rights considerations are central across the spectrum of the
refugee problem, from departure, through refuge, to solutions.
Violations of human rights are a major cause of forced displacement . . . .
Human rights considerations are key to the realization of long-term
solutions to the problems of forced displacement. Implementation of
human rights standards is inseparable form the overall goal of conflictresolution and peace. Invoking the language of human rights and
available international remedies for human rights violations can help the
victims of forced displacement.
Id.
60 Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy High Comm’r for Human Rights, Office of the
U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Address at the Conference of the Parties to
the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol (Dec. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/013DC0FAA475EC87C1
2573B10074796A?opendocument
61 See id. at 465–66 (describing the role that human rights treaty bodies play in
an analytical and advocacy sense in the growing climate change regime).
62 See Kyung-wha Kang, supra note 60 (examining the obligations which
international human rights law imposes on states that are relevant to addressing
human vulnerabilities to climate change).
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itself, by holding governments, the duty-bearers accountable to
reducing the vulnerability . . . to global warming and assisting
them in adapting to the consequences.”63 Thus, the human rights
approach to climate change provides a “framework” wherein
obligations to protect human rights are enforceable against
governments.
4.4. Protected Rights Imperiled by Climate Change
For Tuvalu, human rights may represent a last avenue towards
some sort of remedy. The United States and Australia, as well as
many other developed nations who emit GHGs, have ratified most
of the foundational human rights documents, including the
Universal
Declaration
on
Human
Rights
(“Universal
Declaration”),64 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”),65 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).66 These documents give
rise to international legal obligations that Tuvaluans and other
environmentally displaced persons could use to advocate their
position against emitters. The rights enumerated below are most
pertinent to Tuvalu.
4.4.1.

Right to Life

The right to life is the most important human right: “without
it, no other rights would make sense,”67 and it is considered a
peremptory norm of international law.68 Thus, no derogation is
permitted—even in times of emergency—and it can only be

Id.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, ¶ 1, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter
Universal Declaration].
65 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR].
66 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm [hereinafter ICESCR].
67 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 1373.
68 See, e.g., Sumudu Atapattu, Global Climate Change: Can Human Rights (and
Human Beings) Survive this Onslaught?, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 35, 45
(2008) (describing the right to life as the most fundamental of all rights).
63
64
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modified by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.69 The right to life is universal and
obligatory, enshrined explicitly or implicitly in every international
human rights instrument.70
Due to increased risks of hurricanes, flooding, air pollution,
vector-borne diseases, famine, and heat waves, climate change
threatens the right to life of people all over the world.71 Tuvaluans
can argue that they are “facing extinction,” and that they have
become “endangered because of climate change,”72 because the
rising oceans will completely drown their nation and make it
impossible for them to continue their indigenous way of life.
4.4.2.

Right to Health

Article 25 of the Universal Declaration guarantees the “right to
a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services . . . . ”73 Similarly, the
ICESCR recognizes the human right to health as the “right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of

69 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (defining a peremptory or jus cogens
norm).
70 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 1373–74 (listing the human rights
instruments containing the right to life). Among them are the Universal
Declaration, Article 3; the ICCPR, Article 6; the Inter-American Convention,
Article 4; the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 4; the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Article 3; and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 4. Id.
71 See, e.g., Atapattu, supra note 68, at 46 (“[A]s a result of climate change, the
right to life of people all over the world will be at risk due to increased incidence
of hurricanes, cyclones, flooding, heat waves, increased air pollution, and vector
borne diseases.”); notes 32–42 and accompanying text (describing the devastating
potential effects of climate change on Tuvalu).
72 These arguments are borrowed from a petition submitted by the Inuit
peoples against GHG emitters in the United States. Atapattu, supra note 68, at 46.
The Inuit are facing a similar fate as the Tuvaluans; their homes on the Arctic ice
are melting due to rising global temperatures. See id. at 55–58 (discussing the
rights argued for by the Inuit Petition); Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Petition to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations
Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United
States (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ICC_Petition
_7Dec05.pdf (arguing that the United States is the largest contributor to the
climate change problem, which is adversely affecting every aspect of Inuit life).
73 Universal Declaration, supra note 64, art. 25.
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physical and mental health.”74 The right to health and well-being75
is closely associated with rights to food, adequate living
conditions, and safe and healthy working conditions.76 Climate
change also poses serious health consequences, such as “premature
death, serious illness, and the spread of disease.”77 Furthermore,
threats to the food supply, natural disasters, infectious diseases,
sea-level rise, changes in precipitation patterns, and increased
incidences of extreme weather events will impair the right to
health.78 This right could be instrumental to Tuvalu’s argument
that even if climate change does not engulf its islands, it will
destroy all chances of healthy life that would remain: the islands
would be uninhabitable due to salt-water invasion, crop poisoning,
flooding, storms, and disease.79
4.4.3.

Right to Food and Water

Also intertwined with the rights to life and health is the right to
food and water. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration and Article
11 of the ICESCR link the rights to life and health with adequate
food.80 Additionally, in 2002, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee recognized water access as a basic human right.81 For
Tuvalu, these rights will be especially imperiled by the rising sea
level. Pulaka, the island’s main agricultural food source, is a slow-

ICESCR, supra note 66, art. 12.
See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 1375–76 (listing human rights
instruments containing the right to health and well-being).
76 See id. at 1375 (examining how many human rights instruments treat the
right to health as closely related to the rights to food, adequate living conditions,
and safe and healthy working conditions).
77 Sara C. Aminzadeh, Note, A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights
Implications of Climate Change, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 231, 252 (2007).
78 See id. at 253–354 (describing long-term health consequences of humaninduced climate change).
79 See supra Section 2.3 (describing the effects of climate change on Tuvalu).
80 See ICESCR, supra note 66, art. 11 (“The States Parties to the present
covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for
himself and his family, including adequate food . . . ”); Universal Declaration,
supra note 64, art. 25 (“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food . . .”).
81 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights
[ECOSOC], 29th Sess., General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, para. 1, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english
/issues/water/docs/CESCR_GC_15.pdf (discussing access to water as a basic
human right).
74
75
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growing tuber that has been threatened increasingly by the rising
ocean level. Fresh water security is now a major problem for
Tuvaluans.
Frustrated farmers have seen their pulaka pits
poisoned by salt water intrusions from flooding, and increasingly,
the islanders have had to import their food.82 Islanders will have
to change their agricultural way of life and adapt to western diets
in order to survive.
4.4.4.

Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination and
Cultural Expression

The rights to self-determination and cultural expression are
particularly important to indigenous peoples, as their way of life
and very existence are often inextricably tied to their
environment.83 Because “[t]he survival of indigenous peoples
depends upon the integrity of their environment, . . . indigenous
rights [are violated] through direct and indirect harm to the people
and the resources that sustain them.”84 In the recognition of these
rights as inviolable, Tuvalu has a very strong argument against the
emitting world. If global warming, as predicted, causes the sea
level to rise more than the few meters necessary to completely
submerge Tuvalu, the islanders lose their entire physical nation.
Yet, it does not stop there. As it turns out, when islands sink,
they not only lose their land, but also the territorial waters
surrounding their islands.85 As one article points out, “if a country
sinks in its entirety, then not only will that people lose their nation,
and their seat in the United Nations General Assembly, but they
also lose their territorial waters.”86 One would think that there are

82 See Mark Hayes, We Are All Tuvaluans, 12 GRIFFITH REV. 172, 180 (2007),
available at www.tuvaluislands.com/features/GriffithReview2007/GriffithReview
2007-01-05.html (“The effects of global warming here are not spectacular. They’re
creeping and insidious, weakening the already fragile fabric that enables this tiny
atoll society to exist.”).
83 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 1383–86 (providing a list of human
rights instruments containing the rights to self-determination and cultural
expression).
84 Id. at 1383; see also RALSTON ET AL., supra note 30, at 8–11 (describing how
the loss of resources that Tuvaluans depend upon for life could spell disaster for
the island’s people, even before the island drowns).
85 See Söderblom, supra note 17, at 62 (“Territorial waters are determined
from a country’s coastline. If a coastline shifts then the Exclusive Economic Zone
of a nation (generally an area of 200 nautical miles) shifts too.”).
86 Id.
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surely international protections against such devastating losses,
against the denial of fundamental human rights such as the right to
live, to keep one’s history, and to have a future. Such protections
do exist. When the ocean drowns Tuvalu, the loss of sovereignty
and statelessness caused by climate change will violate Tuvalu’s
rights of self-determination.
Article 22 of the Universal Declaration exemplifies the interplay
of self-determination and cultural expression:
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social
security and is entitled to realization, through national
effort and international co-operation and in accordance
with the organization and resources of each State, of the
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his
dignity and the free development of his personality.87
Additionally, other international treaties support these basic
human rights: article 1 of the ICESCR protects the right of selfdetermination, and articles 15 of the ICESCR and 27 of the ICCPR
guarantee the right to enjoy one’s own culture.88
Thus, the loss of the islands will signal the loss of the Tuvaluan
history and way of life. Forced to move to a “mainland,”
Tuvaluans will be faced with new industrialized societies and
economic hardships. Their agricultural and subsistence based way
of life will, most likely, be lost forever. This would violate the
“dignity” and “free development” of the Tuvalu peoples, because
they would no longer be able to raise their children as they wish, to
live in conjunction with the land and sea as they have always done,
and to continue to celebrate their unique history, geography, and

Universal Declaration, supra note 64, art. 22.
See ICCPR, supra note 65, art. 27 (“In those States in which ethnic, religious
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be
denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practise [sic] their own religion, or to use their
own language.”); ICESCR, supra note 66, art. 1 (“All peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”); id. art. 15
(protecting “the right of everyone . . . to take part in cultural life”); Limon, supra
note 58, at 455–56 (“What are the obligations of states, in the context of climate
change, to respect the right of self-determination and to prevent loss of
statehood?”).
87
88
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culture.89 They would lose their right and ability to culturally
express themselves as they wish.
4.4.5.

Right to Property

The right to use and enjoy property clearly covers the loss of
one’s entire nation. Article 17 of the Universal Declaration
provides that “[e]veryone has the right to own property” and also
that everyone the right not to be “arbitrarily deprived of his
property.”90 Tuvaluans “face mass resettlement choices and
destruction of culturally and historically significant lands and
buildings.”91 Indeed, many islanders have already accepted that
resettlement is the only action available, as their land will one day
be underwater.
Violation of these human rights is happening or will happen
soon, as the waters close in over Tuvalu. Contained within their
various instruments, these rights demand that something be done.
The continued emission of GHGs, which further exacerbates global
warming and rising ocean levels, violates these rights and
demands recourse.
4.5. Legal Recourse Under The Human Rights Lens
Once violations of some of these basic human rights have been
established, the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (“OHCHR”) argues that States have legal obligations to:
(1) Refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of human
rights in other countries;
(2) Take measures to prevent third parties (e.g. private
companies) over which they hold influence from interfering
with the enjoyment of human rights in other countries;

89 See, e.g., Alexandra Berzon, Tuvalu is Drowning, SALON.COM, Mar. 31, 2006,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/03/31/tuvalu/print.html
(last
visited Mar. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Berzon] (describing the impact climate change
will have upon the Tuvaluan way of life); All Things Considered: Tiny Island Makes
Climate a Priority (National Public Radio broadcast June 4, 2007), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10712509
(interviewing the President of Palau, a nation facing a similar fate, wherein the
President laments that the children will have to move off the island and find jobs
elsewhere in trades unfamiliar and unknown to them).
90 Universal Declaration, supra note 64, art. 17.
91 Aminzadeh, supra note 77, at 249.
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(3) Take steps through international assistance and
cooperation, depending on the availability of resources, to
facilitate fulfillment of human rights in other countries,
including disaster relief, emergency assistance, and
assistance to refugees and displaced persons; and
(4) Ensure that human rights are given due attention in
international agreements and that such agreements do not
adversely impact upon human rights.92
Thus, after establishing the violation of its human rights, Tuvalu
could demand injunctive relief to prevent companies from
producing products that contribute to global warming or request
redress for its climate change refugees and displaced persons. The
OHCHR further suggests that:
[A]ll states party that are to the ICESCR have a legal
obligation through international cooperation (i.e., the [U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change] process) to
reduce emissions to levels consistent with the full
enjoyment of human rights (i.e., safe levels) in all other
countries (especially vulnerable countries), [and] to find
adaptation measures in vulnerable countries . . . . 93
The OHCHR recognizes and supports the linkage between
climate change, human rights, and obligations on emitting states.
Once a breach of a duty under one of the basic, universal human
rights treaties has been established, it will be much easier for states
like Tuvalu to demand that other states fulfill certain obligations,
enjoin companies or other third parties within their jurisdictions to
stop exacerbating warming effects, provide assistance and aid,
including refugee asylum, and include climate policy
considerations in future negotiations.
5.

DEMANDS TO EXPAND THE REFUGEE REGIME

The options for Tuvalu are few. While the remedy under
refugee law—namely, asylum—is not perfect, it seems to be the
only card Tuvalu has left to play. Sadly, international law as it
92 Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Report of the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship
Between Human Rights and Climate Change, para. 86, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61
(Jan. 15, 2009).
93 Limon, supra note 58, at 455.
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currently stands is not adequate to protect them.94 As the globe
continues to warm, predictions show millions more climate change
refugees will soon be fleeing their homes looking for asylum as a
last resort. The needs of those countries, coupled with the human
rights argument, demand a renegotiation of the Refugee
Convention that considers environmental concerns.
Current
climate change refugees can and should insist, based on their
violated human rights, on being included within the refugee
framework. While critics staunchly defend the strict reading of the
Refugee Convention definition, the retooling of this international
definition may not be as difficult as it sounds. In fact, some
scholars have already advocated for such an expansion as “no
more than an easy extension of human rights policy.”95 For
example, Cooper argues that “‘since the 1951 refugee definition is
heavily imbued with human rights notions, and environmental
refugees are no less entitled to their basic rights and needs than
their traditional counterparts, using human rights concepts to
expand the refugee definition has natural appeal.’”96 In addition,
Musalo et al. comment on how “[t]he realities of the human
condition have continued to exert powerful stretching forces upon
the traditional refugee definition,” underlining the need for an
expanded definition and inclusiveness to “more fully respond to
the broad range of individuals who flee in fear.”97 Certainly,
Tuvaluans will “flee in fear” if and when their homes are
completely underwater. Their “reality” as climate change refugees
requires a “stretching” of the traditional refugee definition.
There is support even within the current regime itself for a
more expansive approach to defining who qualifies as a refugee.
The framers of the Refugee Convention recognized that certain
individuals not explicitly falling within the treaty’s provisions
would have legitimate and compelling claims for international
protection.98 The participants at the drafting convention closed out

94 See Falstrom, supra note 53, at 2 (advocating for a new convention rather
than an expansion of the Refugee Convention as a means to protect climate
change refugees).
95 Cooper, supra note 42, at 488.
96 Id.
97 MUSALO ET AL., supra note 48, at 54–55.
98 See id. at 55 (describing how the participants at the drafting convention
adopted the Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, §IV, E).
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negotiations by unanimously adopting the Final Act of the United
Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees
and Stateless Persons, §IV, E:
The Conference, [e]xpresses the hope that the Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees will have value as an
example exceeding its contractual scope and that all nations
will be guided by it in granting so far as possible to persons
in their territory as refugees and who would not be covered
by the terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it
provides.99
The framers of the Refugee Convention explicitly intended that
the Convention apply beyond its explicated terms, and more as a
guide for permissible migrations of refugees. They also recognized
the limitations in the definition and hoped that these would be
“exceeded.” Potential arguments for the expansion of the refugee
regime to include EDP could proceed as follows.
5.1. Well-Founded Fear
Proving a well-founded fear requires establishing a situation
wherein “a reasonable person in the same circumstances would
fear persecution.”100 As numerous reports have concluded, Tuvalu
will be subsumed. The islanders all fear this end to their way of
life, and live with the reality of this fate every day.101 This fear is
indeed well founded, and no credibility hearings need be
conducted. Reports from countless NGOs, scientists, policy
analysts, and individuals on the ground confirm that Tuvalu will
likely drown out of existence. This violates the Tuvaluans’ rights
to life, and, by consequence, all other human rights.
5.2. Persecution
Tuvalu may encounter resistance to its application of
“persecution.” As traditionally read, this usually involves an act of
government or perhaps outsider groups fighting the government,
but not the ocean. Nevertheless, the original Refugee Convention
Id.
Falstrom, supra note 53, at 9.
101 See generally RALSTON ET AL., supra note 30 (examining the threat climate
change poses to Tuvalu and the drastic impact it will have on the Tuvaluan way
of life).
99

100
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never defined persecution. Proponents of an expanded definition
clarify that persecution can also mean the “sustained or systematic
denial of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state
protection.”102 The interpretation of “persecution” as “the failure
of governments to protect” will greatly help climate change
refugees, who usually flee natural disasters. Moreover, with the
expanded reading of persecution, it is not just the natural actors
themselves that cause the harm, but also the inability of the climate
change refugees’ governments to help. The governments’ inability
to mitigate and adapt to climate change, both financially as well as
with proper infrastructure, does affect only a set of people and does
deny them their basic human rights, as protected and required by
the Declaration, the Refugee Convention, and countless other
international norms and documents.
5.3. On the Grounds of . . .
Indeed, while the straight definition of a refugee does not allow
for environmental disturbances as a justified ground for fleeing,
two regional organizations or conferences have adopted refugee
definitions that expand upon the 1951 Convention framework and
that could perhaps prove useful for future documents. The
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa allows for “events
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his
country of origin or nationality” as legitimate grounds for refugee
status in addition to the five traditional grounds.103 Similarly,
Central American states adopted the Cartagena Declaration on
Refugees, which also provides refuge for those fleeing “seriously
disturbed public order.”104
These two regional agreements
recognize the validity of flight in the circumstances of generalized
danger, which climate changes could be considered. As the world
continues to deal with more disasters and events causing fleeing,
more regions of the world should adopt these broader regional

MUSALO, supra note 48, at 231.
Organization of African Unity, Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art. I, para. 2, June 20, 1974, 1001 U.N.T.S.
45.
104 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, sec. III.3, Nov. 22, 1984, reprinted in 3
UNHCR, COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND LEGAL TEXTS
CONCERNING REFUGEES AND OTHERS OF CONCERN TO UNHCR 1197 (2007).
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documents allowing refuge for more than the five recognized
reasons.
Even arguing under the traditional five groups, the case can be
made that climate change refugees fit into this rubric. They are
members of a “particular social group” who are persecuted on
account of their membership. Critics of this expansion decry this
application of the “social group” grounds for refugee status as
“environmentally-displaced persons do not fit [in this category]
because they do not have the immutable characteristic required to
provide refugee status under the existing definition.”105 It is
precisely here, though, that they do fit. I argue that EDP, such as
the Tuvaluans, do indeed have “immutable characteristics”—their
culture, home, and history—for which they suffer persecution.
Furthermore, these universal rights (which Tuvaluans already
have) will be sacrificed when the ocean overtakes their island. If
Tuvalu were not a small island in the Pacific Ocean in between
Australia and Hawaii, it would not be in danger of its government
being unable to stop the ocean from rising too high. Its people
would not fear increasing carbon emissions from around the globe
ending their very way of life. They have a well-founded fear of
persecution precisely because of their membership in the social
group of Tuvaluans—a group of small island dwellers whose
homes are in peril due to the rise in sea levels.
Based on human rights arguments and on the need to protect
the rights enumerated above, the current regime should be revised
to include climate change refugees. After all, a refugee is a
refugee.106
6.

CONCLUSION

For Tuvalu, the future is bleak. Tuvaluans have human rights
and principles of international law in their favor, but these
intangibles will not save their island from a watery death. Even
though most Tuvaluans have not given up and continue to
spearhead international cries to stop global warming, the island
will most likely drown, save some miracle adaptation measures
that might not exist and that no one is willing to pay for. What

Falstrom, supra note 53, at 11.
See Berzon, supra note 89 (quoting a climate change advocate who believes
“’[t]hese people are being forced into a position of [sic] where they have nowhere
to go, including home, and that’s the definition of a refugee.’”).
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they really need now is a dry place to call home and on which to
rebuild their nation. As former Tuvaluan Prime Minister Koloa
Talake heartbreakingly explained in a radio interview about his
decision to abandon his home and move to New Zealand, “the
only thing that [he] will bring to New Zealand is his atlas, so when
[Tuvalu] finally disappears, his grandchildren or their children will
still be able to see the dot on the map that once upon a time was a
country called Tuvalu.”107
An important lesson to take away from the Tuvalu cause is that
Tatou ne Tuvalu Katoa—we are all Tuvaluans.108 Tuvalu may be the
first “climate change nation casualty,” but it certainly will not be
the last. There is a need for a new legal regime capable of handling
the exodus that will occur in the future due to climate change and
able to give the future Tuvalus some hope for a future. A change
in the definition of refugee should be enacted internationally.
Climate change refugees should be included, because they do
suffer fears of economic persecution and because they do require
help from the international community. A refugee is a refugee,
and the legal definition of refugee should be expanded to include
all those who flee their homes in fear, suffer violations to their
basic human rights, and who seek asylum in order to survive.

NPR, supra note 4.
See Hayes, supra note 82, at 175 (citing the phrase as “used by some
environmentalists who understand that global warming and rising sea levels,
while gravely threatening the existence of low-lying tropical island countries like
Tuvalu, threaten us all”).
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